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Abstract
The main goal of this academic paper is to provide an assessment of the 
current Antitrust regulatory framework in Serbia along with an analysis of 
Antitrust Commission practice in this field. This paper comprises of five 
sections. The first section focuses on the general provisions of Antitrust 
policy. The second part elaborates four segments of Antitrust policy. The 
third section gives an insight into the development of Serbian regulatory 
framework, as well as an overview of the current situation. In the fourth 
segment the analysis of practices used by Antitrust Commission based 
on the most important indicators is given. Conclusions and directions 
for further research are given in the last section. 
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The importance of Antitrust policy
Adequate Antitrust policy practice that has as its basic goals fair competition 
and customer welfare increase is an important feature for every market 
economy. Aforementioned primary goal of increased customer welfare is 
closely intertwined with a number of other goals. E.g., on the macroeconomic 
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level, effective leveraging of Antitrust policy (hereinafter AP) leads to the 
overall competitiveness increase of the national economy as a whole through 
the elimination of monopolies per se as well as of barriers to entry induced 
by monopoly – like behavior. Intensive competition on the domestic market is 
an important precondition for the emergence of highly competitive companies 
on the global market (Porter 1990). Japanese globally competitive companies 
are a suitable example in support of this statement. I.e., for all the companies 
that subsequently became highly globally competitive a strong competitive 
pressure on the domestic (Japanese) market preceded. Industries that fit to 
this example are: cars, motors, cameras and musical instruments etc. On the 
other side of the spectrum are industries characterized by scarce competitive 
dynamics on the domestic market such as construction or paper industry, 
which did not provide any notable global contender.  
On the level of individual competitors, AP disables excessive market power 
concentration, collusion among competitors as well as different types of 
dominant position abuse. This further makes the adverse market selection of 
inefficient companies less possible. Moreover, in such a setting prices are an 
outcome of equilibrium between supply and demand and market contenders 
cannot affect them. As a result, competitors make only the decision regarding 
optimal production quantity, i.e. the quantity that leads to the minimization 
of average costs. If such an approach is stimulated over a period of time 
production becomes more efficient and productive. Besides cost / price 
minimization, contenders can also compete through product differentiation on 
the market or in a market niche. 
On the basis of these examinations, it could be argued that intensive market 
competition leads to: lower product prices, better quality, broader offer 
available to consumer, higher rates of economic growth and subsequently 
increased employment possibilities.
Four basic segments of Antitrust policy
Serbian regulatory framework (Law on competition protection of 2009 (The 
Law further on) and Law on state aid control and monitoring of 2009) clearly 
indicates crucial segments of AP, namely:
1) Restriction of agreements on prices and market share (cartel agreements)
2) Restriction of dominant market position abuse
3) Market concentration monitoring and control
4) State aid control and monitoring
Cartels. Secret agreements between two or more companies that define 
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prices, production and / or supply quotas and market segmentation are 
regarded as cartel agreements. All agreements of this kind, along with 
various other actions leading to limitation or prevention of competition, are 
forbidden by law. More precisely, the following practices are forbidden: the 
determination of direct / indirect sales / input prices, predetermination of share 
on the input or output markets, determination of production quotas and product 
types, organized boycott of other market participants, or sharing confidential 
information with competitors. Agreements that include these elements are 
considered restrictive and therefore void. Furthermore, the law considers 
verbal collusions and implicitly coordinated actions of collusive competitors to 
be cartel agreements.   
Тhe following are hypothetical examples of cartel agreements. E.g., companies 
A and B have agreed upon refusing to sell products at a predefined fixed price. 
The second example would be the situation in which companies X and Y 
have agreed not to compete for the same buyers, meaning that X would not 
offer its products to buyers of Y and vice versa. The third case could relate 
to the firms C and D that agreed to simultaneously increase product prices 
10%. These are typical examples of cartel agreements. The fact that they 
are mostly secret and verbally agreed makes these collusive actions hard to 
prove. However a similar case was discovered and successfully sanctioned in 
Greece (collusive agreement between food retail chains on prices). The key 
for providing necessary proofs was the permission to wire mobile phones of 
involved representatives. 
Restrictive agreements could, however, be exempt from restriction in certain 
cases (The Law of 2009, Articles 11 – 14). Exemptions are made when a 
restrictive agreement contributes to the development of production and 
turnover (i.e. when it contributes to technical or economic progress) in the 
industry and makes it possible for consumers to gain a fair share in benefits 
achieved. Another condition that is to be satisfied is the absence of imposed 
market barriers that are not necessary for an agreement to be functional. 
I.e. competition on the whole / relevant part of the market should not be 
excluded. When requested by involved parties, AC could exempt an individual 
restrictive agreement from restriction (individual exemption). Less important 
agreements are exempt from restriction by default. With this in mind, less 
important agreements under the provisions of Serbian regulatory framework 
are the ones made by competitors that: have combined market share of less 
then or equal to 10% when the same production and turnover chain level 
is considered (horizontal agreements); have combined market share of less 
than or equal to 15% when different levels of production and turnover chain 
are considered (vertical agreements); have combined market share of 10% 
and it is hard to distinguish whether the agreement is vertical or horizontal in 
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nature or whether it has features of both vertical and horizontal agreement; 
have combined market share of less than or equal to 30% given that those 
agreements affect market in a similar way and given that their individual 
market share on each market affected by the agreement does not exceed 5%. 
Besides these precise preconditions, in order for less important agreements 
to be allowed, they must not refer to price level determination, production or 
sales volume restriction or market fragmentation. 
Dominant market position abuse (abuse of dominant position further on). 
Competition analysis is always made of so called relevant market. There are 
two criteria used for the definition of a relevant market: geographical (area for 
which the level of market concentration is determined) and relevant product 
market (competitors that produce a substitute for a product of a particular 
company). After boundaries of relevant market are defined the existence 
of dominant position is assessed. The assumption that an absolute market 
share of 40% indicates dominant position is the most common choice for 
AC, although there are additional assumptions defined by the law (absence 
of notable competition, favorable position in the input market, etc.) After 
the relevant market is defined and the dominant position is confirmed, AC 
approaches towards the determination of dominant position abuse. 
Abuse of dominant position usually includes direct or indirect imposition 
of input or output prices as well as imposition of other unfavorable trade 
conditions, restrictions of  production volume, reduction in the offer diversity or 
technological development unfavorable to the customer, application of different 
business terms to comparable undertakings with different partners that leads 
to unfavorable competitive position (buyer or supplier discrimination) as well 
as imposed inclusion of additional contractual terms that are essentially 
unrelated to the subject of contract or contradict common trade practice.  
Most frequent forms of dominant position abuse include: imposition of 
unreasonably high prices to customers, predatory prices (net sales price below 
variable or full cost price), fixing or minimizing consumer prices, costumer 
discrimination through provisory differentiation in the rebate policy towards 
different customers, tying as the means for making sales mandatory (e.g., 
when costumer intends to buy “Plazma” cakes from Bambi company,  she 
is obliged to also buy chocolate produced by Bambi) and bundling (e.g. if 
customer is to buy “Plazma” cakes from Bambi company, she is obliged to buy 
all the products within the Bambi product assortment). Shelve space rental 
that disproportionately exceeds market share of the company is also regarded 
as an action indicating dominant position abuse.    
Although dominant position is not forbidden per se, every abuse of dominant 
Antıtrust polıcy ın Serbıa: regulatory framework and enforcement mechanısm 
JCEBI, Vol.2 (2015) No.2, pp. 75 - 92 |  79 
position is forbidden and sentenced by law. Fines are set in the range from 1 to 
10% of annual revenue. AC is also allowed to issue the order of temporary or 
permanent operation seizure for a particular entity. Reputation of “monopolist” 
is often the worst effect of being prosecuted / fined for abuse of dominant 
position because it undermines company credibility and leads to the value 
discounting in the final instance.
Concentration. Excessive concentration of market power achieved through 
external company growth (merger and acquisition transactions) is forbidden 
by law. Therefore, concentration approval procedure is defined. In essence, if 
individual or combined turnover of companies that are subject to concentration 
exceeds the defined threshold, the approval from AC is necessary for such a 
concentration to be conducted. The effects of prospective concentration on 
market power distribution are assessed on the basis of autonomously gathered 
information, or information provided by the subjects to the procedure. Metrics 
used by AC include: CR indicator, HH index or Gini coefficient. These tools for 
concentration assessment are not the subject of this paper and therefore will 
not be further elaborated.
AC approves only the acts of concentration that do not lead to excessive 
market power augmentation or probability of competition dynamics distortion in 
the respective market. Besides binary decision on the particular concentration 
case (Yes / No), AC can issue conditional decisions. The acquisition of 
Mercator by Agrokor is an example for such practice. The concentration was 
approved under the condition that a certain number of Idea markets (owned 
by Agrokor concern) cease operations while another group had to reduce the 
selling space.  
The existence of “natural” monopolies in the national markets was the 
characteristic of planned economies. When AP is not implemented prior to 
privatization, public monopolies tend to become legal private monopolies 
during the transition process. 
State aid. Legal framework (Law on state aid of 2009, Articles – 5) defines 
allowed and prohibited state aid. State aid which inhibits competition in the 
market or contradicts signed international agreements (e.g. Stabilization and 
Association Agreement – Chapter 8, “Competition policy”) is prohibited. On 
the other hand, social aid, aid for preservation of natural or cultural heritage 
as well as natural disaster or other emergency relief programmes are allowed. 
The practice of aiding certain industries is quite common in developing 
countries. Instruments such as subsidies, tax reduction or write – off, equity 
increases or debt write – off are used for this purpose. Effects on competition 
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remain the same irrespective of selected instrument. Companies aided by the 
state are not motivated to make an additional effort in order to achieve and 
leverage the economies of scale, reach higher efficiency or increase national 
or global competitiveness in any other way. That is why a state aid control and 
monitoring is implemented hand in hand with state aid policy. The aim of state 
aid monitoring and control is to reduce the possibility of uneven aid distribution 
among companies and subsequent creation of preferable position to a limited 
number of entities. The emergence of such disbalances would lead to an unfair 
market contest which should be otherwise based on economic efficiency and 
limited state aid and intervention.   
The analysis of regulatory framework
The first legal acts regulating certain aspects of Antitrust compliance in Serbia 
were enacted in the beginning of the 20th century through the regulatory 
framework of Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1922. Later, during 
the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1974.) and Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (1996.) further regulation was enacted. The first modern Antitrust 
Law (the Law further on) was enacted in 2005. At present the Law of 2009 
with amendments from 2013 is in force. The Antitrust Commission (AC further 
on) is established in 2006 based on the Law of 2005 (Matić Bošković, 2014). 
Antitrust policy in Serbia was firstly institutionalized in 1996. by the adoption 
of Anti – Monopoly law in 1996. Prior to this solution competition protection 
was regulated through the Law on Trade. The Department of Anti – Monopoly 
Affairs was in charge of competition – related issues until the Antitrust Law 
came into force in 2005 (Maksimović and Radosavljević, 2012). General 
provisions of this law were defined according to the Articles 101, 102 and 107 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU further on). 
In the Article 3 of TFEU it is envisaged that “the establishing of the competition 
rules necessary for the functioning of the internal market”. This claim is further 
elaborated in the Article 119 by emphasizing that “for the purposes set out in 
Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union, the activities of the Member States 
and the Union shall include, as provided in the Treaties, the adoption of an 
economic policy which is based on the close coordination of Member States’ 
economic policies, on the internal market and on the definition of common 
objectives, and conducted in accordance with the principle of an open market 
economy with free competition.” It is obvious that these provisions were used 
as the starting point for Serbian competition protection regulatory framework. 
Furthermore, concentration monitoring and control system as well as equal 
treatment of private and public entities in Serbia was established under 
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the provisions defined in the Article 106 of the TFEU. Provisions of Article 
101 were the basis for defining relevant aspects of restrictive agreements 
regulation while the provisions of Article 202 were implemented in the field of 
dominant position abuse.  
The Antitrust Law of 2005 was defined in accordance with EU guidelines. 
It is important to note that there was not much space to make changes that 
would include nationally – specific features in the law. Consumer welfare is the 
primary goal.  Three types of anti – competitive behavior are clearly defined 
in the Law: excessive concentration of market power, cartel agreements and 
abuse of dominant position. The development of important decrees in the 
Law over the last three versions (2005, 2009, 2013) along with the critical 
assessment is given further on. 
The first drawback of Law of 2005 is the absence of dominant position 
definition (Article 15). This issue is in a way similar to the situation from the 
version of 1996 in which dominant position was defined but clear metrics for 
its determination were absent. Deterministic definition introduced in 2009 
version of the law approached the determination of dominant position “taking 
into account the magnitude of market share, economic and financial strength, 
availability of procurement and distribution markets as well as legal and 
situational barriers to entry for other market participants”. After amendments 
were introduced in the 2013 version, certain improvements have been made, in 
particular with reference to the contents of Article 15 which was changed to the 
following: “Market participant which can conduct business on a relevant market 
with a high level of independence from other existing or potential competitors, 
buyers, customers, suppliers or consumers is considered to have dominant 
position. Market power of individual participant is determined by accounting for 
economic and other indicators, in particular: 1) Structure of relevant market; 
2) Market share of participant that is subject to the assessment of dominant 
position; 3) Current and potential competitors; 4) Economic and financial 
strength; 5) The level of vertical integration; 6) Preferable position in terms 
of approach to supply and distribution market 7) Legal or situational barriers 
to entry for other market participants 8) Customer influence 9) Advantages 
in terms of technology or intellectual property”. It is, however, indicated that 
assessment of each individual indicators is not mandatory. Moreover it is not 
indicated which indicators are the most important. This makes it possible for 
AC to define adequate indicators for each particular case.
The second important issue is the determination of dominant position 
abuse. This violation of competitive behavior is defined in the Article 16 of 
the Law and has not been subject to changes since the inception in 2009. 
Furthermore, it is also essentially the same as the definition used in the Law of 
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2005. Aforementioned Article states that “abuse of dominant market position is 
forbidden. Dominant position encompasses the following actions in particular: 
1) the direct or indirect imposing of unfair input or product prices or other 
unfavorable business conditions; 2) the imposing of limitations to production 
as well as market or technical development; 3) application of different business 
conditions to comparable arrangements with different market participants that 
leads to the unfavorable position of some participants; 4) conditioning the 
contract for partner by additional obligations that differ from contracted subject 
in terms of nature  and / or common practice.” Harmonization of Article 16 of 
the Law and Article 102 of the TFEU is obvious and could be regarded as 
positive.
Third important topic is the fact that considerable problems were experienced 
during the enforcement of the Law of 2005. AC was not authorized to 
define fines for market participants that did not execute its orders. More 
precisely, the enforcement of the law was assigned to Magistrates` courts 
which made it impossible for AC to both investigate violations and execute 
final decisions (including fines). This inconsistency was extensively leveraged 
by the companies. Due to the inefficient solution of several disputable cases 
of dominant position abuse (e.g. the case of IMLEK company) that became 
subject to the statute of limitations, Serbia received operating aid from EU in 
the field Antitrust policy system.   
Instruments of law enforcement were assigned to the AC in the Law of 2009 
while the legal process was transferred from Magistrates` courts to the Supreme 
Court of Cassation and Constitutional Court. AC was authorized to exercise 
resolutions and determine sentences. Sentence is determined in the area of 
1 – 10% of total revenue from relevant market. Introduced changes made the 
whole process faster and more efficient. Possibility for cases to reach legal 
obsolescence was considerably reduced thus making this strategy ineffective 
for legal representatives of the companies. The latest solution gives powers 
to AC to assess competition violations and determine the means for removing 
them. The following measures are used as the means for recuperation of 
competitive setting: de-concentration measures, behavioristic measures and 
structural measures.
Legal framework for Antitrust compliance was supplemented with following 
bylaws:
•	 Government Act on the content of inquiry for individual exemption from 
restrictive agreements from prohibition
•	 Government Act on the criteria for the relevant market determination
•	 Government Act on the content of application for concentration 
approval and procedure for its submission
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•	 Government Act on agreements between market participants situated 
in different segments of production and distribution chain (vertical 
agreements) that are exempt from prohibition
•	 Government Act on research and development agreements between 
market participants situated in the same segment of production and 
distribution chain (horizontal agreements)
•	 Government Act on criteria for the determination of the sentence 
amount paid on the basis Antitrust measures, process sentences, 
means and deadlines of payment and conditions for the determination 
of these measures
•	 Government Act on conditions for the exemption from payment of 
Antitrust compliance fine (leniency program)  
Fourth issue relates to the exemption from measures of Antitrust policy. The 
Law of 2005 allowed for exemption of companies of, so called, strategic “social 
importance”. Since this status was acquired relatively easy in practice, the 
application of Antitrust Law was seriously undermined. The exemption from 
regulation relating to restrictive agreements and the option to conditionally 
allow for concentration existed in all version of the Law (2005, 2009, 2013). 
The latter is often used as a way to allow concentration and simultaneously 
simulate conservative approach of the PCP (e.g. the case of Mercator and 
Agrokor where concentration was allowed with requirements for Idea to close 
several markets and reduce the selling space in several of its markets). It is 
important to indicate that the discretion of AC in approach to the exemption 
provision is a problem rather than exemptions per se.
The fifth issue is caused by the fact that laws of 2005 and 2009 almost 
exclusively focused on proving the intention to commit competition violation, 
thus redirecting attention from other important topic such as the determination 
of real effects of supposed anti – competitive practice. No analysis of decisions 
made and fines issued was made insofar with an intention to measure the 
effect on the market dynamics of actions undertaken.  
Irrespective of an array of positive changes introduced by the Law of 2009 
and subsequent amendments of 2013 certain flaws of reformed regulatory 
framework should be indicated. 
Firstly, certain provisions are less precisely defined than in the Law of 
2005. In the Article 6, e.g. it is stated that Government should define concrete 
criteria for the determination of relevant market. Such a solution is a step 
back compared to the previous one since the Regulation on the criteria for the 
relevant market determination defined necessary indicators with this regard. 
Current solution leaves AC without analytical framework for the determination 
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of both relevant product and geographical market thus making this initial and 
crucial step in the competition analysis undefined.
Secondly, the sentencing system was entirely shifted. AC was authorized for the 
decision regarding sentencing instead of Magistrates` courts (The Law of 2009, 
Articles 38 and 68). Capacities of Serbian AC to make decisions in considerably 
complex cases with potential financial effect on the subject company measured 
in EUR millions is questionable having in mind the experience and know – how 
available. Capability of conducting complex economic and econometric analysis 
as basis for decisions about sentences is particularly unclear.  
Thirdly, complaints of companies that are subject to AC examination are 
submitted to the Administrative Court that currently does not possess 
adequate knowledge and experience to tackle them properly. The practice 
of either absolute confirmation or abolition of AC decisions is in line with this 
conclusion. As a result the risk of cases being transferred to other constitutional 
courts or International Court for Human Rights in Strasbourg is substantially 
increased. This could further lead to the increase in the fiscal burden having 
in mind the fines paid after a case is lost in Strasbourg.
Fourthly, as result of lobbying from the AC the Articles considering the 
approval of concentration did not change leaving AC with the possibility to 
increase the revenue gathered on the basis of sentences. Besides that the 
acquisition of control over competitor (both partial or total) is considered as 
concentration. Further explanations are made in order to more clearly define 
when acquisition leads to concentration:
•	 If the value of acquired share exceeds 50% of other participants total 
assets 
•	 If the acquired share presents the core business of other participant
•	 If the value of acquired share exceeds certain threshold
Given that AC is a self – financed institution, it is clear that such an approach 
aimed at the increase in the number of applications for concentration approval 
and subsequent augmentation of sentence – related income. The fact that 
Serbian AC processed by far the largest number of applications compared to 
the similar institutions in the countries of region comes as no surprise (e.g. 5 
times more than in Croatia). Although current approach implemented in the Law 
was subject to intense criticism, no changes are intended. For example, Article 
61, paragraph 1, point 1 states that almost every multinational corporation 
conducting business in Serbia must report every act of concentration 
irrespective of the region in which it takes place. The question of adequacy 
of concentration approval fee arises if it is known that values are 25000 EUR 
(for shortened procedure) and 50000 EUR (for examination procedure). 
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Such a setting could drive away multinational companies that have intensive 
concentration activity over a short period of time. If necessary administrative 
capacity for these actions would also be taken into account, the former would 
seem even more probable.
Fifthly, the criteria for the exemption from the law application are not clearly 
defined (on the basis of Articles 12 and 13 from the Law of 2009). The most 
obvious example is the definition of de minimus principle which indicates that 
market participants that own small market share should not be a matter of 
consideration even when they commit anti – competition activities. The ratio for 
such assumption is the fact that small entities do not affect market mechanism 
considerably. Besides de minimus principle, anti – competitive practices that 
are proven to foster production and trade or contribute to the economic and 
technical progress in general are exempt from the measures of AP. These 
practices should, however, provide consumers with the fair share of the benefits 
and should not impose restrictions / barriers to other market participants or 
exclude competition on the relevant market / relevant part of the relevant 
market. Although these situations seem appropriate to be exempted from the 
application of the Law, imprecise criteria and the fact that final decisions are 
in the ACs sole discretion make abuse in this area probable. General practice 
shows that exemptions should be applied particularly to (Ahikari 2004): small 
and medium enterprises (SMEs), research and development agreements; 
joint procurement organized by a group of micro / small enterprises in order to 
reduce costs and increase competitiveness; trade associations; agreements 
between producers with the purpose of expanding to foreign markets or 
promoting export, etc.   
The analysis of the Antitrust Commission practice
Low level of competition in an economy is frequently caused by the absence 
of adequate Antitrust policy. In order to make this effect possible there are 
requirements that should be met: the use of preventive measures should be 
preferred over punitive measures; the separation of investigative and judicial 
powers; the implementation of clear criteria for the initiation of investigation; 
the existence of clear and transparent appeal procedure; the possibility to 
claim compensation for the damage caused by anti – competitive behavior 
of certain market participants; equal treatment of public and private entities 
in terms of law application; the definition of adequate competition protection 
measures; the protection of confidential information; the permanent promotion 
of Antitrust policy and the achievement of legal and formal independency of 
entity in charge Antitrust compliance.
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 Preventive measures in focus
Cost minimization is one of the ways to achieve competitiveness. High fines 
applied by AC when provisions of the Law are violated have quite the opposite 
effect since they increase the costs for affected companies. General consensus 
among policy makers in the field is that the sentences should be higher than 
the abnormal profits earned partially or entirely through the anti – competitive 
practice in order to de-motivate companies to commit such actions (Khemani 
1995). Companies could incur substantial financial effects or even losses as a 
result of this approach. Even profitable firms could be severely struck. When 
anti – competitive actions are consciously undertaken, “initiator – company” 
accounts for the potential financial effects of sentences, which is not the case 
for companies that violate regulations unintentionally. This could lead to the 
absurd situation where otherwise competition driven firms are financially 
burdened or even driven out of the business due to the unanticipated costs. 
This a strong argument in favor of preventive measures.      
The separation of investigative and judicial powers
The Law of 2009 introduced the AC both with the investigative authority and 
the authority to define the competition protection measures and sentenced 
companies that restricted, prevented or undermined market competition. This 
was not the case previously since the investigative authority and the decision 
on the existence of violation was assigned to the AC while the sentencing 
process was in the authority of Magistrates` courts. In order to implement 
a mechanism for controlling and assessing ACs decision such division of 
authorities should be reestablished.
Initiation of investigation
Clear criteria on the adequate grounds for initiation of investigation are 
important for several reasons. Firstly, the lack of such criteria makes the 
regulatory framework incomplete which leads companies to account for higher 
regulatory risk when they assess the potential investment in particular country. 
As a result, the prospects of investing in a country with such legal system 
do not seem attractive. This leads to decrease of foreign investment and, 
furthermore, it reduces the competitive pressure thus limiting the possibilities 
for the increase in competitiveness.
The appeal mechanism
The introduction of adequate appeal mechanism would contribute to the 
strengthening of ACs credibility. Clear procedure for submitting appeals to the 
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government body coordinated to AC is crucial for the functioning of such a 
mechanism. Benefits of introducing this change are twofold. On the one hand, 
subjects to ACs investigation would be given an opportunity to react when 
sentences are inadequate or unjust for some reason while on the other AC 
would have to make decision making process better in order to avoid the loss 
of credibility in the relation to coordinated government body.
Equal treatment of public and private entities and the possibility of 
compensation for the damage caused by anti – competitive behavior
Both final customers and other market participants should have a possibility 
to be compensated for the damage caused by anti – competitive actions. This 
option should be included in the regulatory framework. Besides that it is crucial 
that Antitrust policy be applied to both public and private companies.
Adequate competition protection measures
Adequate competition protection measures should be applied to a company 
that was proven to have been conducting anti – competitive actions. These 
efforts should both reduce the possibility of further anti – competitive behavior 
and neutralize negative effects caused to other market participants and final 
consumers. Financial sentences are determined when damage caused to the 
functioning o market is substantial. This measure should be used particularly 
when anti – competitive actions are intentionally committed with the goal of 
market share and / or profit increase. Therefore the value of issued sentence 
should exceed gains acquired through sanctioned behavior. If amounts of 
fines are known in advance and made transparently available, then Antitrust 
policy achieves an a priori effect.       
The protection of confidential information / avoiding conflict of interest
Subjects to the investigation by AC have to make large amount of important data 
available. Due to the considerable risk that this data may become available to 
the competitors, it is important that AC establishes reliable mechanism for the 
protection of confidential data. Besides that, AC should guarantee the safety 
of provided information to the companies that are subject to investigation.
The promotion of Antitrust policy
In some cases anti – competitive actions of market participants are caused 
by the introduction of Government acts in different fields of economic / social 
policy. Together with the fact that market processes are dynamic per se this 
is the reason for coordination between Antitrust policy and other relevant 
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Government policies both in the field of regulatory framework development 
and practical implementation. In order to create “coordination mindset” among 
policy decision makers, AC should continuously promote competition rules 
and their importance. These efforts would increase the responsibility and 
commitment to the goals of AP both in Government and AC. Besides that 
potential positive and negative implications would be discovered and used as 
valuable contribution in decision – making – process. 
The independence of AC
Political influence should be reduced as much as possible if AC is to make 
fair decisions based on the objective investigations and transparent criteria. 
Establishing AC as an entity that is organizationally independent from other 
government bodies and removing the possibility for political turmoil to affect 
the election / replacement of AC Council members would decrease overall 
political influence on this institution.  
The financing of AC
In the end it is important to tackle the question of AC financing. Several things 
are important with this regard. Firstly, AC should have enough resources to 
attract qualified employees capable of making fair decisions on the AP related 
issues. Secondly, the required independence of AC should be further reinforced 
with self – financing strategy. Main sources of income for AC or similar entities 
are fees and sentences collected through the application Antitrust measures. 
This approach could, however, create substantial problems since the focus of 
AC is then easily transferred to agglomeration of income through excessive 
imposition of (unfair) sentences and / or distortion of criteria for concentration 
approvals. As a result, important cases of competition rules violation could 
end up uninvestigated and not sentenced.  
The question of sources for the AC financing should not be in focus since 
the adequate mechanism for the assessment of ACs decisions is a more 
important topic. Crucial issue with this regard is the one of the cost – benefit 
effect of ACs decisions. It is argued (Voigt, 2006) that the crucial preconditions 
for successful AP are the quality of AC and judicial system.
The speech of the former president of British Competition and Markets 
Authority (CMA further on) is a nice example of the effective entity for 
competition protection. During the 10 – year – period CMA handled 4 cases of 
4 billion UK pounds combined worth. The damage incurred to consumers was 
2 billion UK pounds on the car market solely. The second area of significant 
competition violation was the telecommunications market with charges of up 
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to 40% above the competitive level. In this case solely, corrections made to 
the competitive behavior of market participants resulted in benefits of 325 
– 700 million UK pounds to final consumers compared to the 2,5 million UK 
pounds of budgetary resources used.
Similar examples of Antitrust compliance violation could be found all over the 
world and irrespective of affected sectors. In Spain, e.g. the price of sugar was 
5 – 10% higher than the EU average for a certain period of time. Spanish entity 
authorized for the Antitrust compliance determined the cartel agreement on 
the sugar market and fined involved market participants for 8,7 million EUR. 
This leads to the increase in market competition that subsequently transferred 
to the markets of products that use sugar as input.
The last observation tackles the lack of adequate focus of Serbian AC. 
Further on are elaborated the arguments in favor of this claim.
Firstly, the primary field of ACs involvement is the application for 
concentration approval which indicates the focus on the fee – related 
income increase. The fact that the Law of 2013 defined low thresholds for the 
concentration that requires reporting made it possible for AC to leverage this 
resource as the main source of income.
Secondly, overall impression is that AC does not demonstrate the 
determination to investigate competitive practices of multinational 
companies present in Serbia. The same stands for the large companies of the 
financial sector. It is important to indicate that The National Bank of Serbia has 
the authority over financial institutions with exempts AC from responsibility in 
this area. 
Thirdly, the ACs independence is not entirely achieved. Members of ACs 
Council are elected by the National Assembly in a process that includes 
aggressive lobbying. Furthermore, current and former members did not 
possess adequate experience in the field of Antitrust compliance. The same 
stands for the know – how in economy and econometrics. However, the last 
version of the Law introduces a mandatory election of two members with the 
academic / business background in economics.
Fourthly, AC focused on minor (in the sense of cost – benefit trade – off) cases 
including those of Kragujevac cemetery and main bus station in Ljig. With no 
intention to underestimate the importance of these cases the feeling is that 
there are a number of more important issues that should have been tackled 
by the AC.
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Fifthly, AC did not invest enough effort in conducting sector analyses that 
would lead to the determination of anti – competitive practice. Besides that, 
ex post analysis of punitive measures imposed by the AC is absent. 
Conclusion
The segments Antitrust policy in Serbia based on the Antitrust Law and 
practice of Antitrust Commission are assessed systematically and thoroughly 
in this paper. The effect of positive and negative elements of the Law and ACs 
practice on the competition protection parameters is explained.
It is concluded that the current Law directly refers to the recommendations 
from the EU with little or no adjustments to the local setting. Consumer welfare 
is the primary goal outlined in the Law. Three practices are explicitly prohibited 
by the Law: excessive concentration of market power, cartel agreements and 
the abuse of dominant (market) position. 
The analysis of Law of 2005 has indicated that this version had multiple serious 
issues although it was based on the general regulatory framework of the EU. 
The issues elaborated in the paper are: the definition of dominant position, 
the parameters of dominant position abuse, inefficient application due to the 
jurisdictions of Magistrates` courts, the neglect of state aid issue, discretionary 
exemption rules, the focus on proving the intention of anti – competitive activity 
instead of determining the effects. 
The Law of 2009 introduced several improvements such as more concise 
definition of dominant position and anti – competitive actions that indicate 
abuse of dominant position. Authority for the determination of sentence 
is transferred to the AC and is in the range of 1 – 10% of annual revenue 
generated by company on the relevant market. This made the procedure more 
efficient and significantly reduced the possibility of case obsolescence thus 
making this strategy less viable for legal teams of investigated companies. 
The exemptions from the application of Law are more precisely stated but 
there is still substantial discretion in this field. The following negative elements 
are perceived: several provisions are less precise compared to the solution 
of 2005; the logic of sentencing was entirely changed but still focuses on 
irrelevant aspects; appeals are submitted to the Administrative Court although 
this institution does not possess the necessary know – how and resources 
to handle them; thresholds for obligatory concentration approval remained 
unreasonably low; exemptions are still not defined precisely enough. 
The AC practice could be regarded as satisfactory mostly because positive 
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trends are perceived. However, the following segments have proven to be 
problematic or absent: preference of preventive measures over punitive, the 
separation of investigative and judicial powers, the existence of clear criteria 
for the initiation of investigating procedure, the existence of clear appeal 
procedure, the possibility of requesting a compensation for damage caused 
by anti – competitive behavior of other market participants, equal application 
of the Law to public and private entities, the definition of adequate competition 
protection measures, the protection of confidential information, continual 
promotion of Antitrust compliance and achievement of more noticeable 
legal and formal independence of AC. Particularly important conclusion is 
the one regarding unclear or absent focus of AC. This statement is based 
on the absence of cases in the fields of dominant position abuse and 
restrictive agreements as well as the lack of determination in tackling the anti 
– competitive practices committed by multinational companies and financial 
companies. Further negative features are strong political influence particularly 
in the field of Council Member selection, focus on minor cases, absence of 
sector analyses and absence of previous practice assessment. 
Having in mind all aforementioned arguments, the overall conclusion is that 
the Law was improved in 2009 and 2013 versions compared to the solution 
provided in 2005, particularly in the fields of dominant position definition as well 
as the definition of dominant position abuse. Further on, AC was authorized to 
exercise sentences. Discretion in the field of exemption from the Law was also 
reduced. However, the new regulatory framework did not introduce substantial 
improvements. Inconsistencies and drawbacks that originated from such 
setting are outlined in the paper. The analysis of AC practice showed that this 
institution is much more capable of tackling even the most complex cases. 
The improvement of know – how in the fields of economics and econometrics 
would be a valuable provision to this. Other suggestions on improving the 
functionality and effectiveness of AC are stated in the paper.
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